To describe a state flow in situational theory of conflict in this paper we propose a model that combines the theory of Markov chains and game theory as a finite-state machine. A complete classification of lowdimensional automata and some analytical expressions for the average Bayesian payoff are obtained.
Introduction
The classical theory of finite-state automata [1] supposes its work with the deterministic meaning of the input signal. I.e. for any input symbol, there exists a unique state of the next transition. In other words, deterministic finite-state automata given as quintuple A = (s, x, y, f, g), where s is a finite set of states; (x, y) is the input and output alphabet, respectively; f is the state-transition function; g is the output function. A natural generalization of deterministic finite-state machine is to use of random variables as its arguments. For example, in [2] Rabin introduced nondeterministic automata, in which the transition function f was defined by a stochastic matrix. In [3] a probabilistic finite-state automaton game type has been suggested. Input of this automaton is a sequence of player's strategies (a 0 The number of payment matrices is determined by the number of possible states of the automaton (S 0 , S 1 , ..., S n ): Probabilistic characteristics of the machine arise in cases, when one from two players is the nature. Then the human response strategies can be calculated using, for example, the Bayesian criterion. In paper [3] with use of this machine was simulated concrete situation of crash of the flood dam during floods on the Amur River in 2013. In [4] , this scheme was used for situational simulation of the Zeya hydroelectric power station in extreme situations. In those articles the system had 3 and 5 states, respectively. In those works the authors did not find an analytical solution of tasks. In this connection was used StateFlow simulation methods with help Simulink Matlab package. The aim of this work is the classification of all possible states of Bayesian machine type used in [3] (with 3 states)
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and analytical solution to some of them.
Preliminary Notes
Consider steps of analytical solution of Bayesian automata (1). .
2) For a given probability of arrival of input signal b k from Bayesian criterion we find an optimal strategies for all games a * k . (Obviously, they do not necessarily coincide.)
3) The product a * k b m generates input (i.e. argument function f ), which determine the change in a system state at the next step
For simplicity, we will to use the following notation. Because our machine has 3 states, the set of all possible transition f form a 3-ary logical function of 3 · 2 2 = 12 variables (i.e. total N = 3 12 = 531441 automata). However, because of Nash's theorem asserts that any finite game has a solution in pure or mixed strategies, the number of different Bayesian machine is reduced by half.
Further we will use for classification only zero strategies of nature, given that for other automata the solutions can be obtained by redefining of the number of strategy and components of the payoff matrix.
For example, function
corresponds to the sequence (S 1 , S 1 , S 2 , S 2 , S 0 , S 1 ) = (112201) . Stateflow diagram of this function has the form. Further, using the symmetry properties the remaining machines may be grouped as equivalent i.e. having the same limit states and average winnings.
For example machines (000,000.000001, 000002, ..., 002222) are equivalent. Similarly, the machines {010212 ≡ 010221 ≡ 012012 ≡ 100212 ≡ 01221 ≡ 100221 ≡ 102012} are equivalent. As a result, we obtain 6 3 = 216 different type of machines
where
Now we remove the automata in which the transition functions is irrelevant. For example, for automaton (000022) the last four values are not significant, since the states S 1 and S 2 are unattainable by definition. Finally, amount of machines is reduced to 57: This machine has the following transition function Suppose Bayes criterion suggests optimal choice of the zero-point strategies for all games. We denote these strategies by a * = a 0 . Then for simplicity and without loss of generality, we relabel the entries of payoff matrix as
We now introduce the notation
and define the player's payoff on first step as
The player's payoff on second step is
Further,
Then normalized player's payoff for our automaton is
Analytical solution of 112211-automaton.
This machine has the following transition function
and components of the vectors of optimal strategies:
= (e 00 , e 01 ) = (e 0 , e 1 ).
In this case the normalized player's payoff for our automaton is
5 Analytical solution of 112200-automaton.
The normalized player's payoff this automaton is
6 Analytical solution of 112212-automaton.
This machine has the following transition function f . . .
Last equation may be easy calculated with help well-known sum
and the normalized player's payoff for our automaton can be written as
7 Analytical solution of 112202-automaton.
This machine has the following transition function f . . . 9 Conclusions.
In this paper, a complete classification of Bayesian automata type (1) was presented. As a result, we received 57 non-equivalent machines. Notice that if graph of automaton has branched structure then to get an exact solution is not always possible. Therefore, the analysis of specific models should be carried out by methods of situational modeling [3, 4] . If the model has an exact solution then its analysis is a simple substitution of the payoff matrix components into analytical expressions.
